Taskscapes

"When concern makes present by awaiting and retaining, time is understood in relation to a "for-which"; and this in turn is ultimately tied up with a "for-the-sake-of-which" of Dasein's potentiality-for-Being. With this "in-order-to" relation, the time which has been made public makes manifest that structure with which we have earlier iii become acquainted as significance, and which constitutes the worldhood of the world. As 'the time for something', the time which has been made public has essentially a world-character. Hence the time which makes itself public in the temporalizing of temporality is what we designate as "world-time". And we designate it thus not because it is presentat-hand as an entity within-the-world (which it can never be), but because it belongs to the world [zur Welt] in the sense which we have Interpreted existential-ontologically. In the following pages we must show how the essential relations of the world-structure (the 'in-order-to', for example) are connected with public time (the 'then, when . . .', for example) by reason of the ecstatico-horizonal constitution of temporality. Only now, in any case, can the time with which we concern ourselves be completely characterized as to its structure: it is datable, spanned, and public; and as having this structure, it belongs to the world itself."

Heidegger, B&T, pág. 467 (meu negrito)

É fundamental ligar esta ideia com a ideia de taskscape do Ingold. Elas encaixam mas ao mesmo tempo mostra-se numa profunda diferença sobre o que é de facto o conceito de temporalidade. É que a temporalidade em Heidegger não é o "tempo para", nem o tempo "em que faço". A temporalidade é o tempo da ekstasis (poupo-vos ao grega, mas o conceito só pode ser entendido do modo como o conceito é expresso em grego, mas que compreendemos na nossa êxtase).
A temporalidade de Ingold é a temporalização da temporalidade, o "tempo-mundo" tal como expressa em Heidegger.