Erlebnis

"Heidegger’s identification and critique of the connection between machination and lived-experience mark his most direct rejection of a range of projects in the nineteenth-century philosophy of subjectivity, project that identified subjectivity with ‘life’ and saw ‘livedexperience’ as the vital foundation for all aesthetic and cultural productions.
Heidegger must certainly have had in mind, for instance, Dilthey’s repeated invocation, throughout his ‘philosophy of world-views’ of the subjective, lived-experience of the individual thinker as the basis for any possible philosophy or artistic creation. A decade earlier, in Being and Time, Heidegger had already criticized the orientation of Dilthey’s investigations toward the problematic of ‘life’, suggesting that although Dilthey’s philosophy contains an ‘inexplicit’ tendency toward fundamental clarification, this tendency cannot be fulfilled by it, for the philosophical orientation which begins with the life and lived-experience of individual persons (and here, Heidegger identifies not only Dilthey, but also Husserl, Bergson, and Scheler as adherents to this orientation) still cannot raise the question of the being of the person. As early as Being and Time, therefore, Heidegger begins to develop a critique of Erlebnis that also aims to criticize the
prevailing ‘anthropologistic’ or humanistic philosophy of subjectivity, and indeed the entire subjective/objective contrast that it presupposes."

Livinsgtone, Paul (2003) "Thinking and Being: Heidegger and Wittgenstein on Machination and Lived-Experience" Inquiry 46 pags 324-345